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Introduction 
Civil society has always been weak in Greece (Lyrintzis 2002: 92; Mouzelis 2002: 238-245). 
Few voluntary associations and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) have been recorded 
compared to other countries, while participation in such bodies has remained relatively low 
(Sotiropoulos 2004: 8). Additionally, civil society has been criticised for its strong, unhealthy 
dependence on the Greek state, as it has never actually succeeded in developing autonomous 
rules and values away from politics (Polyzoidis 2009: 191). In this respect, civil society in 
Greece has not achieved anything of substance, particularly in the social field, mainly due to 
a lack of state support, inconsistent government policies (Polyzoidis 2009), and, persistent, 
highly polarised political party confrontations (Robolis et al 1995). 
However, at the beginning of the 21st century, the civil society landscape in Greece started to 
change quite substantially (Gropas and Triandafyllidou 2012). Migrant associations, 
networks of associations of migrant and mainstream human rights NGOs, or NGOs active in 
the protection of refugee’ and asylum seekers’ rights, anti-discrimination, or the fight against 
racism and xenophobia created an increasingly vocal civil society (Gropas and 
Triandafyllidou 2009: 5). The availability of EU sources of funding1 greatly contributed to 
this development, which coincided with a period of consolidation of Greek civil society 
(ibid). These two processes reinforced each other, in particular in the human rights and anti-
discrimination field (ibid).  
In this respect, a number of academic studies have been produced on migrant associations 
and migrant-/refugee- serving NGOs in Greece. With regard to the former, most of these 
studies have focused on a limited number of associations, which have been analysed as 
instances of self-organisation and solidarity of migrant communities in Greece (e.g. 
Kavoulakos 2006; Petronoti 2001; Schumbert 2004; Zachou and Kalerante 2009). Clarke 
(2013), however, has taken a much more holistic approach by examining how national 
contexts affect migrant associations as transnational actors in comparative perspective. 
Through qualitative interviews with members of migrant associations, and analysis of the 
most comprehensive relevant survey to date (i.e. Harokopio University 2009), she identified 
128 such organisations, which are non-professionalised, disproportionately concentrated in 
and around Athens, relying on informal social networks and volunteers, and which are 
underfunded, which inevitably limits their range of activities to social and cultural, practical 
support, education and training, and maintaining links with countries of origin (see also 
Papadopoulos et al 2013). Indeed, the state-centred nature of the institutional framework in 
 
1 EQUAL and INTERREG, for instance. 
Greece renders migrant associations weak, and suffering from limited recognition, and non-
significant civil societal force (Gropas and Triantafyllidou 2005). 
Migrant-/refugee- serving NGOs in Greece, on the other hand, are understood in the 
academic literature as ‘effective consulting or mediating organisations which act towards the 
improvement of migrants’ position in the host societies’ (Papadopoulos et al 2013: 344), 
while they multiply their areas of activity in order to promote the social inclusion of the less 
integrated target populations (Kavoulakos 2006; Varouxi 2008). Papadopoulos et al (2013) 
put forward an excellent account of migrant associations and NGOs2 in Greece in the context 
of the economic crisis, based on data collected in 2009 and 2010, by incorporating references 
to all recorded migration-related social actors operating in the country. According to their 
account, the majority of  NGOs were established in the pre-2000 period by non-migrants, and 
they are medium to large-scale organisations, using modern management tools and 
approaching migration as a topical issue of concern to Greece (ibid: 346, 355). They seek to 
address a broader range of issues, from the social inclusion of disadvantaged groups to the 
provision of services to migrant populations (ibid: 346). More specifically, their objectives 
include the protection of human rights, the encouragement of migrants’ social integration, the 
promotion of multiculturalism and intercultural dialogue, and the sponsorship of  
education/training of migrants (ibid: 347).  
Moreover, they appear to be over-concentrated in Athens, and they benefit from being 
strategically located near public services and decision-making centres, without being far 
away from migrant groups at the same time (ibid: 355). Due to their organisational ability to 
provide services to migrants, and their institutional capacity to participate in migration 
policy-making, they operate state services aimed at the social integration and healthcare of 
migrants (ibid: 355). Yet, a number of them are also active along irregular migration 
gateways at the Greek-Turkish borders, monitoring vulnerable migrant groups and providing 
related medical care and support (ibid: 348). Furthermore, the social and business networks 
of NGOs extend transnationally and they also convey valuable social capital which allows 
them to influence migration policy-making and the integration process of migrants (ibid: 
355). Finally, migrant-/refugee-serving NGOs typically have greater economic resources and 
a financial capacity superior to that of  migrant associations, which allow them to have 
permanent salaried staff, while they also rely on voluntary work and internships (ibid: 347). It 
is worth mentioning at this point, that between 2005 and 2009, 61 per cent of migrant-
/refugee- serving NGOs were in receipt of state or EU funding, while 38 per cent of them 
participated in funded projects related to migration (ibid). 
This picture has changed dramatically since the beginning of the economic crisis in Greece in 
late 2009. The vast majority of migrant-/refugee- serving NGOs are now facing major 
funding problems, mainly because they do not have an independent source of income 
(Schaub 2013: 13). ARSIS and the Greek Council for Refugees (GCR) for instance, receive 
 
2 According to Papadopoulos et al. (2013), immigrant associations act like pressure groups that serve the short-
term needs and/or interests of migrants in the host countries. Immigrant-/refugee- serving NGOs, on the other 
hand, play a pivotal role in the consultation processes for migration policy and act as intermediaries for and/or 
represent the interests of migrants/refugees in the host countries. 
most of their funding from the European Commission3, and the Greek government, which 
makes them significantly dependent on their donors’ agendas (ibid). Moreover, the European 
Refugee Fund (ERF) will only cover up to 80 per cent of an accepted project’s costs, leaving 
the remaining 20 per cent to be covered by co-funding from the debt-ridden Greek state. It 
usually takes several months for the Greek state to pay its contribution, meaning that 
organisations have to pre-finance their operations without actually having the essential funds 
(ibid). What is more, the ERF will start to disburse money only when the Greek 
government’s share has been made available, which really complicates the situation (ibid). In 
this respect, a GCR official stated that the organisation is facing ‘huge problems’ due to the 
crisis, and the inability of the Greek state to make available its share of the ERF-funded 
programmes, which has led the organisation to a ‘critical financial situation’4. This situation 
forced the GCR staff to work unpaid for months in 2010 and 20115. Along the same lines, a 
PRAKSIS official reported a significant lack of human resources, medical tools and money to 
buy essential medicines and vaccines, which hinders the effective implementation of the 
organisation’s programmes6.  
Within this context, the austerity measures that accompanied the bailout of Greece are having 
a severe impact on social protection schemes and healthcare services. Policy responses have 
failed to redress the Greek system’s traditional imbalances or to strengthen social safety nets, 
which, as a result, ‘left many victims of the crisis with little or no support, exactly when the 
need for social protection was greater than ever’ (Matsaganis 2012: 416). This situation has 
led, to a situation where a large number of Greeks, such as pensioners, unemployed, 
uninsured, homeless, and HIV-positive patients, are now turning for assistance to 
organisations that did not initially include them in their target populations but instead were 
providing services to migrants and refugees.7 As another interviewee stated, ‘We are now 
dealing with problems that we were not dealing with in the past, such as families with no 
social insurance and no access to vaccines’.8 Thus, various migrant-/refugee-serving NGOs 
have stepped outside their usual responsibilities and launched new programmes that go 
beyond their initial aims and objectives. 
In this respect, this chapter argues that we are witnessing the gradual hybridisation of the 
‘shadow state’ relationships between NGOs and the Greek state, which has been facilitated, 
and at the same time hindered, by the economic crisis. These hybrid ‘shadow state’ 
relationships consist of the decreasing or absent state financial support to migrant-/refugee-
serving NGOs, and the simultaneous increasing conformity of the latter to the Greek state’s 
interests and agenda. In simple terms, it is argued that a number of migrant-/refugee-serving 
NGOs have started taking on various social welfare services for vulnerable populations, at a 
time when the Greek state was unable to provide them and was simultaneously reducing its 
financial support to the migrant-/refugee-serving third sector. 
 
3 Through the European Refugee Fund (ERF). 
4 GCR Official, Greek Council for Refugees, Athens, 20 February 2012. 
5 GCR Staff Member, Greek Council for Refugees, Athens, 16 February 2012. 
6 PRAKSIS Official, PRAKSIS, Athens, 6 December 2011. 
7 DwB Staff Member, Medecins sans Frontieres, Athens, 14 November 2011. 
8 DoW Staff Member, Doctors of the World, Athens, 25 November 2011. 
This chapter draws on a three-month fieldwork in Athens in 2011 and 2012, semi-structured 
interviews with members and officials from migrant-/refugee-serving NGOs, and studies and 
reports that these organisations have produced prior to and since the beginning of the 
economic crisis. It focuses on three of the largest migrant-/refugee-serving NGOs in Greece: 
PRAKSIS, Doctors of the World (DoW), and Doctors without Borders (DwB). The criteria 
for the selection of these cases were, on the one hand, their size, which is also reflected in the 
large number of programmes and geographic areas in which they operate, and, on the other 
hand, the differences in their budgetary fluctuations amidst the economic crisis. More 
specifically, each one of these NGOs represents a unique case in budgetary terms. Since the 
beginning of the crisis, the budget of PRAKSIS has increased, while the budget of DoW has 
remained relatively unaffected and the budget of DwB has decreased. However, all three of 
them multiplied their areas of activity and expanded their target population. 
This chapter starts with an outline of the concept of the ‘shadow state’, which is followed by 
an overview of the consequences of the economic crisis on the Greek welfare state and 
society. The next section presents the ways in which three mainly migrant-/refugee-serving 
NGOs, PRAKSIS, Doctors of the World, and Doctors without Borders reacted to the 
curtailment of the welfare state and the decrease in or lack of state financial support. Finally, 
some concluding remarks are presented in the last section of the chapter. 
 
The ‘Shadow State’ 
The 1960s, 1970s and 1980s were characterised by a series of privatisation activities by 
government agencies in the UK and North America with the aim of restructuring the welfare 
state system (Trudeau 2008: 671). These activities involved the offloading of state 
responsibilities, such as service provision, to non-profit and for-profit organisations (Kodras 
1997). The privatisation of welfare state services materialised through the purchase of service 
contracts that were shifting the responsibility of service provision from the state to civil 
society, while the state still maintained control over the identity of the services’ recipients 
and the amount and duration of the services provided (Smith 2002). This transfer of services 
to the third sector was supported by the ‘Left’ because it seemingly created a welfare system 
friendlier to local preferences and needs (Kodras 1997), and it was supported by the ‘Right’ 
too because it created a ‘lighter’, more flexible state apparatus based on individual initiative 
and self-sufficiency (Wolch 1990). Thus, during this period, ‘the state became especially 
dependent in the area of service delivery, as the practice of contracting with nonprofits to 
provide state-funded services grew common’ (Trudeau 2012: 444). 
In this respect, Geiger and Wolch (1986) pioneered the concept of the ‘shadow state’ in order 
to describe the effects of the increasing importance of the third sector to the operation of the 
welfare state in both the UK and North America during the 1980s. Wolch (1989: 201) defined 
the ‘shadow state’ as a ‘para-state apparatus with collective service responsibilities 
previously shouldered by the public sector, administered outside traditional democratic 
politics, but yet controlled in both formal and informal ways by the state’. In its most basic 
form then, the ‘shadow state’ refers to the existence of an assemblage of NGOs, coming from 
different parts of the voluntary sector, which are assigned to provide state-funded social 
welfare programmes that remain under state control and affect societal inclusion and 
exclusion (Trudeau 2012: 444).  
However, at the same time, service contracting places specific rules, requirements and 
restrictions on NGOs that hinder the provision of state-funded social welfare services (Wolch 
1999). Such limitations are put in place in order for the state to monitor an organisation’s 
performance, enforce eligibility requirements and implement sanctions (Salamon 2002). In 
consequence, ‘the increasing importance of state funding for many voluntary organizations 
has been accompanied by deepening penetration by the state into voluntary group 
organization, management, and goals’ (Wolch 1990: 15), which ultimately obstructs the 
organisation’s potential to create progressive social change (ibid). All in all, the ‘shadow 
state’ concept describes the influence of the state on the activities and agendas of the third 
sector, the capacity of the latter to operate as an entree to civil society, and the implications 
that these relationships pose to democracy (Trudeau 2008: 672). 
Nevertheless, recent developments in the third sector indicate that the relationships between 
the state and NGOs have become more complex and considerably different from those 
described by Geiger and Wolch during the 1980s (Milligan and Fyfe 2005). This does not 
mean that the ‘shadow state’ has ceased to exist; on the contrary, it emphasises the need for 
the development of a theory that captures the variety of power arrangements between state 
and nongovernmental organisations that define contemporary hybrid ‘shadow state’ 
relationships (Trudeau 2008; 2012). Indeed, NGOs are still able ‘to negotiate or inflect state 
influence, pursue independent agendas, and influence state agendas’ (Trudeau, 2008: 672). 
In this respect, Trudeau (2008) has suggested the conceptualisation of ‘shadow state’ 
relationships as a continuum in order to help make sense of the new multiple and hybrid 
state-civil society relationships. Towards one end of this continuum he identifies hierarchical 
arrangements that lead NGOs to implement the state’s agenda. On the other hand, towards the 
opposite end, he identifies flexible and reciprocal arrangements that can advance alternative 
interests and agendas. This latter situation consists of the marginal influence of the state over 
NGOs. These organisations may still receive state funding, but there is very limited capacity 
of the government to influence them in direct or indirect ways. Instead, NGOs pursue 
agendas that are minimally determined by the state, mainly because they prioritise local 
community agendas over those of the state. In this regard, Christensen and Ebrahim (2006) 
highlight the fact that NGOs have relationships of accountability to multiple constituencies. 
At the same time as being held accountable by the state, NGOs staff members also act on a 
sense of responsibility to their colleagues, and they may also develop a sense of responsibility 
to their beneficiaries and the communities that they serve. 
This chapter argues that we are witnessing the gradual hybridisation of the ‘shadow state’ 
relationships between NGOs and the Greek state. Despite the deep economic crisis and the 
accompanying extensive social welfare cutbacks that have affected the state funding of the 
third sector, and the severe bureaucratic obstacles in state funding even prior to the outbreak 
of the crisis, various migrant-/refugee-serving NGOs have continued pursuing the Greek 
state’s interests, with limited or no state financial support. To put it differently, these NGOs, 
not only have continued pursuing the Greek state’s interests to provide social welfare services 
to vulnerable populations through proxies, but they have also managed to multiply their areas 
of activity and expand their target population with limited or no state financial support. This 
has become possible through the gradual development on behalf of the NGOs of a keen sense 
of responsibility to their sponsors, beneficiaries and the communities within which they 
operate. 
 
The Economic Crisis 
The current economic crisis in Greece is one of the deepest in the country’s modern history. 
It started soon after the October 2009 general elections, when the newly elected PASOK 
government announced that earlier fiscal statistics had been falsely reported by the previous 
government, and proceeded with their massive correction (see Bank of Greece 2011). 
However, Greece’s economic crisis worsened since it was bailed out by the Troika in 2010, 
as the deep cuts have had a negative impact on the economy, as acknowledged by the IMF 
(2013). This resulted in a significant increase of inequality (Matsaganis and Leventi 2014: 
209) and social unrest among both native (Rudig and Karyotis 2014) and migrant (Karyotis 
and Skleparis 2014) populations. It is in times of such great social and economic crisis that 
‘those who are most vulnerable are becoming even more vulnerable, not only in terms of 
access to health care services, but also with regard to other determinants of health, including 
the degree of social exclusion, education, housing and general living conditions, quality of 
diet, vulnerability to violence’ (WHO 2010: 5).  
New forms of social exclusion have emerged as an increasing number of people have been 
left unemployed or on very low salaries (DoW 2012: 14): for example, the ‘neo-homeless’ 
are homeless people who had until recently a satisfactory standard of living and have a higher 
educational level, but due to financial difficulties and unemployment they were forced out of 
their homes (Theodorikakou, Alamanou and Katsadoros 2013: 206). At the same time, these 
conditions in combination with the persistent framing of migration as a security threat, have 
generated far Right statements and acts that stigmatise migrants and violate their human 
rights (Karyotis and Skleparis 2013). Brutal attacks and hate crimes against ethnic minorities 
have become a daily phenomenon in Greece in the wake of the economic crisis (HRW 2012). 
All this has led to a growing demand for all forms of social services and aid (DoW 2012: 14), 
as ‘the need for social protection in Greece [is] more pressing than at any other point in the 
past since the end of the Civil War in 1949’ (Matsaganis 2012: 413). 
However, vulnerable groups that were already facing numerous risks prior to the crisis, such 
as undocumented migrants, asylum seekers, drug users, sex workers, destitute European 
citizens and homeless people, have seen a reduction in or the termination of social safety 
nets, which formerly provided them with basic help (DoW 2013a: 2). Despite the WHO’s 
(Mladovsky et al 2012: v) warning that ‘cuts to public spending on health [...]come at a time 
when health systems may require more, not fewer, resources’, the Greek government 
significantly reduced public spending on health and increased the cost of access to healthcare 
services (Kentikelenis et al 2011). This resulted in larger numbers of people being excluded 
from the national healthcare system simply because they could not afford to pay (DoW 2012: 
14). All in all, public spending for health in Greece is now less than any of the other pre-2004 
EU member states (Stuckler and Basu 2013), while the nation has surpassed all other EU 
member states in the scale of cutbacks to the health sector (Reeves et al 2013). 
More specifically, prevention and treatment programmes for illicit drug use, and publicly 
funded pharmaceutical expenditure also underwent severe cuts (Kentikelenis et al 2014: 748-
749). The public hospital budget was reduced by 26 per cent in the first two years of the crisis 
(Kentikelenis et al 2014), and state funding for mental health decreased by more than 20 per 
cent during the same period (Anagnostopoulos and Soumaki 2013). These striking cutbacks 
were implemented within the context of the dramatic increase in the number of new HIV 
infections among injecting drug users from 15 in 2009 to 484 in 2012 (ECDC and WHO 
2013). Moreover, these measures were forced in at a time of mental health deterioration due 
to economic hardships (Economou et al 2013), the skyrocketing of deaths by suicide 
(Kentikelenis et al 2014), and increasing mortality in people older than 55 years (Vlachadis et 
al 2014: 691). Additionally, through shifting healthcare costs to patients, austerity policies 
rendered a large number of people unable to purchase the drugs prescribed by their doctors 
due to insufficient income (Mantzouranis et al 2012), while they forced pharmaceutical 
companies that had profited excessively before 2010 to reduce their supplies due to unpaid 
bills and low profits (Sukkar and Smith 2013). Furthermore, the cuts led to an increase in 
hospital staff workloads and the multiplication of patient waiting lists (Tripsa et al 2013). 
This situation has driven people to rely increasingly on NGOs for assistance (DoW 2012: 14). 
 
Migrant-/Refugee-serving NGOs in Greece 
As noted above, this chapter focuses on three primarily migrant-/refugee-serving NGOs in 
Greece: PRAKSIS, Doctors of the World, and Doctors without Borders. 
 
PRAKSIS 
PRAKSIS is an independent NGO aiming at the development and implementation of 
humanitarian and medical action programmes. It evolved from the ‘internal’ programmes of 
DwB in Greece, becoming independently established in 2004.  
PRAKSIS is active across Greece, but mainly in Athens, Thessaloniki, Mytilene, and Patras. 
However, volunteer teams can be found in various places across the country. The main aim of 
the organisation is to fight the social and economic exclusion of vulnerable groups of people 
and to safeguard their individual and social rights through the provision of free social, 
medical, healthcare and education services. The target population of PRAKSIS includes 
indigent, homeless or uninsured Greeks, migrants, asylum seekers and refugees, trafficking 
victims, homeless children, HIV-positive and mentally ill patients, drug users, Roma, sex 
workers, convicts and former convicts. Recently, PRAKSIS added ‘Greek families that are 
stricken by the economic crisis’ to its target population (Praksis 2013: 9). 
Between 2007 and 2012, the budget of PRAKSIS recorded a fourfold increase, despite the 
severe drop in state financial support. In 2007, the organisation’s budget was €906,430, of 
which 89 per cent was institutional (i.e. state and EU) and 11 per cent private (i.e. 
sponsorships and donations) funds (Praksis 2008). However, in 2012, the budget of the 
organisation skyrocketed to €4,297,725.81, while the contribution of institutional funds 
shrank to 31 per cent, and the input of the private sector grew to 69 per cent (Praksis 2013). 
This gradual turning of the organisation to private sources of funding in the face of state 
funding cutbacks, allowed it not only to continue providing social welfare services to 
vulnerable populations in place of the Greek state, but also to multiply its areas of activity, 
and to increase the number of its staff members. With regard to the latter, there was a 
threefold increase in the number of people working for the organisation (salaried personnel, 
volunteers, interns) in 2012, compared to the same number in 2007 (Praksis 2013).  
The areas of activity of PRAKSIS have also significantly expanded during the economic 
crisis, with the organisation increasing both its geographical reach and its portfolio of 
programs, including the introduction for the first time of holistic programmes targeted 
specifically to Greek families that were hit by the crisis (ibid). Thus, despite the various 
problems associated with the economic crisis, PRAKSIS managed, not only to retain its core 
programmes, but also to expand its areas of activity. The multiplication of PRAKSIS’ areas 
of activity followed a dramatic increase in the number of people seeking the support of the 
organisation since the beginning of the crisis. 
This is reflected in the significant increases in the number of people that used PRAKSIS’ 
polyclinics, drugstores, legal services and housing services in Athens and Thessaloniki 
between 2007 and 2012.  (Praksis 2008; 2009; 2011; 2013). Apart from the expansion of 
PRAKSIS’ target population, a significant change in the organisation’s target nationalities 
can also be observed. More specifically, Greeks never or seldom sought the assistance of 
PRAKSIS prior to the economic crisis. For instance, a statistically non-significant number of 
Greeks visited the organisation’s polyclinics in Athens and Thessaloniki in 2007 (Praksis 
2008), while in 2008, only 5.5 per cent of Thessaloniki’s polyclinic visitors were Greek 
nationals (Praksis 2009). This percentage remained, more or less, at the same levels in 2009 
and 2010 (i.e. 7 per cent) (Praksis 2011). However, in 2011 and 2012, this number more than 
doubled, as Greeks comprised 15.4 per cent of Thessaloniki polyclinic visitors (Praksis 2013). 
A similar increase in the number of Greek beneficiaries was observed in all service sectors of 
the organisation.  
In summary, within the context of the increasing needs of Greek society, the curtailment of 
the Greek welfare state and state funding cutbacks, PRAKSIS managed with limited 
institutional support not only to continue pursuing the interests of the Greek state, but also to 
multiply its areas of activity, broaden its target population and increase its budget and 
workforce, by gradually turning to private sources of funding. Indeed, PRAKSIS saw its 
target population grow significantly in recent years compared to the period prior to the 
economic crisis. Even more migrants have sought the support of the NGO since 2010, while 
considerably large numbers of the native population have also turned to PRAKSIS for 
medical, social and legal assistance.  Subsequently, this led to the multiplication of the 
organisation’s areas of activity in a period when the Greek state reduced its financial support 
to NGOs and struggled to provide social welfare services directly to vulnerable groups. Thus, 
the hybridisation of the ‘shadow state’ relations between PRAKSIS and the Greek state 
consists of the former’s  gradual development of a keen sense of responsibility to its 
increasing number of beneficiaries, sponsors, and communities in need within which it 
operates, in order to continue acting as a proxy for the provision of social welfare services to 
vulnerable populations.  
 
Doctors of the World 
Doctors of the World (DoW) was established in Greece in 1990 as part of the international 
network of the organisation, which consists of 14 departments around the world. The target 
population of the organisation includes victims of natural disasters, famines, diseases, wars, 
conflicts and political violence, refugees, expatriates, minorities, street children, drug addicts, 
and in general, anyone who is unable to gain access to medical care.  
The budget of the Greek DoW remained more or less stable between 2007 and 2012, despite 
the decline in state financial support. (DoW 2008; 2013b). During the same period, one can 
observe a considerable decrease in institutional funding, and a significant turn towards 
alternative sources of funding, such as donations and sponsorships. In 2007, 78 per cent of the 
organisation’s income consisted of institutional funds, while only 18 per cent was derived 
from donations and sponsorships. In contrast, in 2012, the participation of the private sector 
in the NGO’s income skyrocketed to 46 per cent, while, at the same time, the contribution of 
institutional funds dropped to 53 per cent. This turning of the NGO to private sources of 
funding in the face of institutional funding cutbacks, allowed it not only to continue acting as 
a proxy in the provision of welfare services to vulnerable populations in accordance with the 
Greek state’s interests, but also to expand its target population and multiply its areas of 
activity. 
Until 2010, that is prior to the beginning of the economic crisis in Greece, DoW provided 
various services, including healthcare services through its polyclinics in Athens, Thessaloniki 
and Chania. In 2009 alone, approximately 18,000 people benefited from the Athens 
polyclinic services, coming primarily from Iraq, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, various African 
countries, Bulgaria, Poland, Ukraine, and Albania (DoW 2010: 3). Similar healthcare services 
were provided at the Thessaloniki, and Chania polyclinics. 
 However, between 2010 and 2011, the number of Greeks9 visiting the organisation’s 
polyclinics doubled (DoW 2012: 14). Many patients were retired elderly citizens, whose 
pensions have been dramatically reduced since the implementation of the austerity measures 
 
9 This includes Greek Roma. 
in recent years (ibid). It is worth mentioning that, only in 2012, DoW provided their services 
at the Athens polyclinic to approximately 29,600 people, with around 20 per cent of them 
being Greeks (DoW 2013c). This is a more than a twofold increase in the number of people 
visiting the Athens polyclinic, compared to the annual number of the clinic’s beneficiaries 
prior to the economic crisis, which was around 14,000 people (DoW 2010: 3). In the same 
manner, a dramatic increase in the number of people seeking the assistance of DoW was 
recorded in the Thessaloniki and Chania polyclinics too (DoW 2010; DoW 2013c). 
Within this context, the areas of activity of DoW have significantly expanded also during the 
economic crisis. Two new polyclinics have been established since the beginning of the crisis, 
one in Perama, and one in Patras. In contrast to the Athens polyclinic, the vast majority of the 
Perama polyclinic beneficiaries are impoverished and socially excluded Greeks (DoW 2010: 
4). Indeed, approximately 7,400 people visited the Perama polyclinic in 2012, the majority of 
whom were Greeks (DoW 2013c). Moreover, the Patras polyclinic became operational in 
September 2012 aiming at covering the increasing needs of the uninsured and low-income 
residents of the city,  people excluded from the national healthcare system, and those in need 
of international protection (ibid: 3).  
In addition, the organisation’s mobile units also expanded to a number of areas across Greece 
(DoW 2013a: 5). In December 2010, DoW set up two mobile units in order to assist migrants 
and asylum seekers accessing healthcare services in Patras and Igoumenitsa (DoW 2012: 17). 
Neo-homelessness was also addressed by the organisation amidst the economic crisis, as a 
new mobile unit was set up in order to assist in the distribution of sleeping bags and food, and 
the provision of physical and mental healthcare services in different parts of Athens (DoW 
2013a: 6). Moreover, in order to meet the increasing needs of elderly people in Athens and 
Thessaloniki, DoW also set up a mobile unit for the provision of healthcare services and food 
at home (ibid).  
Additionally, in collaboration with the Greek Council for Refugees, DoW developed the 
‘Enough!’ project, in an attempt to address the issue of the rise of far Right extremist acts of 
violence by organising visits to secondary schools and raising awareness about the negative 
consequences of xenophobia for the whole society (ibid). Finally, DoW developed the food 
distribution project that started in November 2011, which provided for the monthly nutrition 
needs of vulnerable groups in Athens and Perama (DoW 2013c: 9). 
In summary, within the context of curtailment of the Greek welfare state, the subsequent 
dramatic increase in the numbers of native and foreign people seeking the support of NGOs, 
and the decline of state financial support to the third sector, DoW managed, not only to 
continue pursuing the interests of the Greek state, but also to multiply its areas of activity and 
broaden its target population. This became possible through the redirection of the 
organisation’s funds from missions abroad to operations and activities in Greece,10 and the 
subsequent turn to alternative private sources of funding, such as donations and sponsorships, 
without, however, upsetting the NGO’s budget, and the total number of operational programs 
 
10 In 2010, DoW announced that it had redirected its humanitarian assistance from the developing world to 
Athens, as almost two million Greeks were facing severe poverty (DoW 2010b). 
(16) before and after the crisis. Thus, similar to the case of PRAKSIS, the hybridisation of the 
‘shadow state’ relations between DoW and the Greek state consists of the former’s gradual 
development of a sense of responsibility to its expanding target groups, in order to continue 
acting as a proxy for the provision of social welfare services to vulnerable populations, with 
limited state financial support. 
 
Doctors without Borders 
Doctors without Borders (DwB) is an international medical humanitarian organisation 
established in France in 1971. It has been active in Greece since 1990 and has provided its 
services to local authorities in emergency situations, such as earthquakes, extreme weather 
conditions and conflagrations. More specifically, the organisation provided assistance to the 
population during the emergency situations that followed the earthquakes in Aigio and 
Athens, the conflagrations in North Peloponnese, the extreme weather conditions in 2012 and 
2013, and in the prevention of malaria in the Sparta region in 2012. Since 2008, DwB has 
been offering healthcare services and psychosocial support to migrants, refugees and asylum 
seekers in detention centres across the Evros region, Thrace, Rodopi, and the islands of the 
Aegean Sea. In contrast to the other two NGOs analysed in the present chapter, the 
operational section of DwB in Greece is characterised by financial independence from 
institutional, that is state and/or European, funding. However, despite this self-sufficiency, 
the economic crisis has severely affected the budget of the organisation, which dropped by 
about one third, from €5,210,251 in 2010 to €3,391,057 in 2012 (DwB 2011; 2013)  
However, the number of programmes of the organisation was not affected by the economic 
crisis or the subsequent income cutbacks. On the contrary, DwB managed to multiply its 
areas of activity. In 2011 the organisation managed not only to continue the provision of 
healthcare services to undocumented migrants across the Evros region, but also to expand its 
areas of activity to the native vulnerable population too. More specifically, after the 
reoccurrence of malaria in Greece, DwB started providing its, services to healthcare units 
across the country in an attempt to assist in the planning of the prevention, monitoring, 
management, control, diagnosis and cure of the disease (DwB 2012: 5). In the same manner, 
in 2012, the NGO continued providing its services to undocumented migrants across the 
Evros region and the islands of the Aegean Sea, while it started targeting its actions for the 
prevention and cure of malaria to the Sparta region (DwB 2013: 4-5). Moreover, during the 
same period DwB expanded its activities to the provision of basic healthcare assistance to the 
homeless population in Athens (ibid). Finally, in 2013 and 2014, the NGO broadened its 
target population even more, as, in cooperation with the Athens council, it started providing 
medical and psychosocial support to vulnerable Greeks and migrants (DwB 2014). 
In summary, DwB has always been independent from institutional sources of funding, and 
this did not change when the economic crisis hit Greece and unsettled the income of the 
organisation. Despite the fact that the organisation was never dependent on state financial 
support, it continued pursuing the Greek state’s agenda, even when its income was severely 
affected by the economic crisis after 2010. By opening out its target population to both 
Greeks and migrants, and by multiplying its areas of activity in order to include the delivery 
of services to the native vulnerable population too, the NGO was able to serve the Greek 
state’s interests through the provision of social welfare services to vulnerable groups, without 
institutional funding. Thus, it can be argued that DwB gradually moved to a form of hybrid 
‘shadow state’ relationship with the Greek state, as with no state support, it continued to 
serve the latter’s interests at a time of severe income curtailment, by developing a sense of 
responsibility, mainly to its beneficiaries, sponsors, and the communities within which it 
operates. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that various mainly migrant-/refugee-serving NGOs in Greece are 
gradually forming hybrid ‘shadow state’ relationships with the Greek state amidst the 
economic crisis. These relationships consist of the decrease in or lack of state financial 
support for migrant-/refugee-serving NGOs, and the simultaneous increasing conformity of 
the latter to the Greek state’s interests and agenda. In other words, despite their budgetary 
fluctuations, these NGOs, have not only continued pursuing the Greek state’s interests in 
providing social welfare services to vulnerable populations through proxies, but they have 
also multiplied their areas of activity and expanded their target population. As noted above, 
this became possible through the gradual development on behalf of these NGOs of a keen 
sense of responsibility to their rising numbers of beneficiaries, sponsors and the communities 
in need within which they operate. Within this context, these NGOs were able to take on 
several social welfare services to vulnerable populations that the Greek governments were 
unable to continue providing in the face of the implemented social welfare cutbacks.  
These developments, amidst the economic crisis in the migrant-/refugee-serving third sector 
in Greece are in stark contrast to the classical ‘shadow state’ theory, which suggests that 
NGOs become increasingly funded and regulated by the state as they take on state functions. 
In this respect, the analytical tool of the ‘shadow state’, in its initial conception by Geiger and 
Wolch in the 1980s, is unable to capture the complexity of recent developments in the third 
sector in Greece. As was previously mentioned, these developments do not mean that the 
‘shadow state’ has ceased to exist. Instead, they emphasise the need to create a theoretical 
concept that captures the diversity of power arrangements between the state and NGOs. In 
this regard, this chapter has drawn on Trudeau’s understanding of ‘shadow state’ 
relationships as a continuum. In these hybrid ‘shadow state’ relationships, state funding is not 
a decisive factor in the shaping of NGOs’ interests and agendas. Rather, it is the sense of 
accountability/responsibility to multiple constituencies, such as the state, sponsors, 
communities and beneficiaries, which is developed by NGOs and influences their interests 
and agendas. Thus, a number of migrant-/refugee serving NGOs in Greece continued 
pursuing the Greek state’s interests amidst the decrease in or lack of state financial support 
due to this sense of responsibility. 
However, not all migrant-/refugee-serving NGOs are capable of creating these hybrid 
‘shadow state’ relationships with the Greek state. This chapter has focused on PRAKSIS, 
DoW, and DwB, which are three of the largest NGOs in Greece with important transnational 
connections. More specifically, the Greek departments of DwB and DoW belong to the 
international networks of these organisations, while PRAKSIS emerged as the evolution of 
the ‘internal’ programmes of DwB in Greece. These connections placed all three NGOs in 
advantageous positions when they decided to seek alternative private sources of funding 
amidst the decrease in or lack of state financial support. Indeed, within the context of 
institutional funding cutbacks in the migrant-/refugee-serving third sector in Greece, it is 
certain that several medium/small-size NGOs, with limited or no transnational connections, 
will not survive, despite their sense of accountability to their beneficiaries and communities 
in need within which they operate. 
The examples of the three NGOs examined in this chapter show hopeful signs of 
development of a strong, healthy civil society, independent from Greek state funding, with its 
own, autonomous rules and values. Yet, the fine balance in the provision of social welfare 
services to vulnerable populations through proxies without substantial state financial support 
and regulation, can be quickly destabilised, creating in this way severe social problems, if 
NGOs prioritise their accountability to private actors over the Greek state. Indeed, ‘it is 
ultimately the responsibility of governments to ensure the protection of the most vulnerable 
populations, which they do not always do anymore. Patients facing multiple vulnerability 
factors need more protection in these times of crisis and xenophobia, not less’ (DoW 2013a: 
2). 
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